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Shale Fever: 
Replicating the US gas revolution in the EU? 
Roderick Kefferpütz 
 
Introduction 
The US natural gas industry is abuzz. Until recently 
the United States seemed poised to become one of the 
world’s largest importers of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG). However, the development of two innovative 
drilling techniques – hydraulic fracturing and 
horizontal drilling – has led to the emergence of new 
unconventional gas supplies, the majority coming from 
gas trapped in shale formations, transforming the 
American energy scene. Today, shale gas is 
responsible for roughly 20% of total US production 
with expectations that it could reach 50% by 2035 – an 
astounding feat given that it represented only 1% back 
in 2000.
1 The increase in US shale gas production also 
contributed to the US displacing the Russian 
Federation as the largest producer of gas, with its 
production of 624 billion cubic meters (bcm) trumping 
Russia’s 582 bcm.
2 In addition, it has caused LNG 
demand to sink and sent prices tumbling, turning the 
market upside-down. 
The ripple effects of the US ‘shale gale’ are already 
being felt abroad. With the US market awash with 
natural gas and prices plummeting to around $4/mBtu 
(million British thermal units), LNG tankers have been 
re-routed to more lucrative markets in Europe, 
upsetting the status quo with Gazprom losing market 
share to cheaper gas sold on the spot market. This has 
even led to some countries such as Algeria calling for 
coordinated cuts in production à la OPEC by the Gas 
                                                      
1 Fueling North America’s Energy Future, IHS CERA Special 
Report, IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates, 
Cambridge, MA, 2010. 
2 “U.S. Overtakes Russia as Biggest Natural Gas Producer”, 
Bloomberg, 12 January 2010. 
Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in order to prop 
up market rates. 
In addition, this so-called ‘quiet revolution’, a term 
coined by BP Chief Executive Tony Hayward, is 
getting louder. Shale fever is now spreading beyond 
the borders of the United States, entering national 
discourses in the European Union where it is seen to 
provide energy independence and jobs, as well as 
cheaper and more environmentally-friendly fuel. 
This is particularly the case in Poland, where a 
veritable land grab is underway for some of its finest 
shale acreage. Poland has also been one of the first 
member states to call on the EU to increase its focus 
on shale gas, with Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski 
stating that it should be at the heart of the EU debate 
on energy security.
3 
Such enthusiasm, however, also needs to take into 
account the unique European context so as not to 
create unreasonable expectations. This CEPS Policy 
Brief hopes to provide a balanced and concise 
overview of the development of and concerns 
surrounding shale gas in the United States, and to 
explore the extent to which this success story could be 
replicated in the European Union. It does not aim to 
investigate how the overall global development of 
shale gas will affect the EU and its focus is primarily 
on shale gas as opposed to unconventional gas in its 
entirety due to the fact that shale gas reserves are 
larger (particularly in the US), have been more 
developed and consequently received more attention in 
political discourse. 
                                                      
3 “Poland calls on Europe to emulate US shale gas 
development”, Bloomberg, 8 April 2010. 
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The US revolution in shale gas 
Although shale gas has only recently entered 
mainstream debates, its history is in fact extremely 
long, with the first commercial well drilled in New 
York in the late 1820s.
4 By the early 1980s there were 
over 10,000 wells in the US with an annual production 
of around 4 bcm. What led to a drastic increase in 
shale production, however, was the development of 
new innovative drilling techniques pioneered by 
Mitchell Energy in the 1980s, namely horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’). These 
new processes allow companies to drill downwards for 
up to 7,000 meters and then turn their drills 
horizontally to continue drilling sideways for up to 
2,000 meters, after which a fine mixture of water, sand 
and chemicals is blasted through the opening, 
fracturing the surrounding shale and allowing the 
trapped gas to escape. 
The major energy companies, however, were 
unconvinced of the value of shale gas, instead 
concentrating their efforts on locating new gas fields 
and thereby leaving the field open for small US 
wildcat drillers that pioneered these new drilling 
techniques with tremendous success. These 
independent prospectors have been able to procure 
more and more acreage opening up many shale ‘plays’, 
the term used to designate areas where oil and gas 
companies are targeting exploration activity. More 
than 30 states are already involved in this sector.
5 
Several additional factors have been key to this 
development. First, the US has been quick to identify 
its shale potential and most important shale plays, with 
large areas leased at a fast pace. Second, the US 
wildcatters have continuously experimented with and 
adapted their drilling techniques, reducing costs. This 
is particularly crucial given the fact that no one shale 
formation is alike, requiring production processes to be 
continuously tweaked and improved. Third, there has 
been little resistance to the development of shale gas 
by local communities due to the fact that population 
density is relatively low and local residents are given 
lucrative royalties in exchange for their mineral rights. 
Fourth, the environmental concerns surrounding shale 
gas, as outlined in more detail below, have not (yet) 
                                                      
4 K. Shirley, “Shale gas exciting again”, AAPG Explorer, 
American Association of Petroleum Geologists, March 2001.  
5 Amongst the most noteworthy are the Barnett play in Texas – 
the birthplace of the shale revolution – holding roughly 7 
billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe), the Marcellus shale 
bordering Pennsylvania, New York and West Virginia, holding 
roughly 44 billion boe, the Haynesville shale straddling 
Louisiana and Texas with 41 billion boe as well as Fayetteville 
located in Arkansas and Oklahoma, home to 7 billion boe. The 
Financial Times provides an excellent map on its website 
(http://www.ft.com/unconventional). 
obstructed its development. Fifth, the development of 
shale gas has benefited from existing pipeline 
networks and sufficient local infrastructure to support 
its exploitation. Last but not least, the natural gas 
industry has received strong political support in the 
form of advantageous tax breaks. 
The unconventional has therefore turned conventional, 
with the development of shale gas dramatically 
increasing estimates of American gas reserves. While 
around three years ago the US was expected to have 
about 30 years’ worth of resources, today the US is 
believed to hold 100 years’ worth at present usage 
rates.
6 Production particularly increased during the 
mid-2000s when natural gas prices were high, as shale 
plays are often cheaper to develop than conventional 
sources of natural gas.
7  
The significance of these developments remained 
unappreciated, however, until 2008, and even then 
only started to enter the US national energy debate in 
the second half of 2009, as policy-makers realised the 
extent to which shale gas could change the US energy 
landscape. Shale gas unlocks a whole new range of 
options, particularly in the context of a carbon-
constrained world and the heated debates surrounding 
climate legislation in Washington. Steven Chu, the US 
energy czar, has confirmed this, stating that natural gas 
will play an increasingly important role in the power 
sector as the US moves towards carbon regulation. 
Increased natural gas supplies are therefore expected to 
displace aging coal power plants with cleaner gas-
powered alternatives, which work well in tandem with 
renewables. Such an alliance in electricity supply 
could also meet greater electricity demand arising from 
the development of electric cars, which would reduce 
CO2 emissions from the transport sector. In addition, 
natural gas itself can be used as a transport fuel. 
It is therefore not surprising that shale gas has attracted 
a lot of political attention. Last year, for example, a 
lobbyist group which representing North America’s 
leading independent natural gas exploration and 
production companies – America’s Natural Gas 
Alliance (ANGA)
8 – was formed, in addition to a 
Natural Gas Caucus in both the US Senate and House 
of Representatives. Launched in October 2009, the 
latter initiative already includes over 40 bipartisan 
representatives and aims to promote awareness and 
develop policy in Congress on the importance of 
natural gas in the US energy portfolio in terms of 
climate change and energy security. 
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Concerns surrounding shale gas 
There are numerous concerns surrounding the 
production of natural gas from shale formations, which 
have gained greater attention with the emergence of a 
broad debate on shale gas supplies. The particular 
process under scrutiny is hydraulic fracturing. Critics 
claim that the large quantities of water mixed with 
chemicals used to fracture the rock can enter aquifers, 
thereby contaminating wells and general drinking 
water. Several cases of dead livestock exposed to 
potassium chloride in water have been recorded as 
have complaints from residents of skin rashes and 
vomiting after using their water. While the industry 
claims that most fractured wells are thousands of 
metres below any potable water supplies and harmful 
chemicals are therefore unable to enter groundwater, 
numerous political actors have nonetheless taken 
decisive actions. Philadelphia officials, for example, 
have already asked their state regulator to ban 
hydraulic fracturing until its effects on drinking water 
have been sufficiently studied and New York Mayor 
Bloomberg wants to ban fracking within the City’s 
watershed, which extends into prospective shale 
production areas.
9  
On Capitol Hill, several legislators are also aiming to 
propose new federal regulations on fracking; Colorado 
Democrat Diana DeGette and New York Democrat 
Maurice Hinchey, for example, are putting forth a 
Fracturing Responsibility & Awareness of Chemicals 
(FRAC) Act, which would regulate the practice under 
the existing Safe Drinking Water Act and force 
industry to disclose the chemicals used in the process. 
This would be quite a reversal from 2005 when 
Congress exempted chemicals used in this technology 
from the Safe Drinking Water Act, an episode often 
dubbed the ‘Halliburton loophole’ after then Vice-
President and former head of Halliburton Dick 
Cheney. Many companies, however, have so far 
resisted these proposals, arguing that disclosure of 
their fracking fluids would give away commercial 
secrets and affect their competitiveness. Congressmen 
Waxman and Markey have also attempted to bring 
more transparency to the sector by sending a letter to 
eight oil service companies, including Halliburton, 
Schlumberger and BJ Services, requesting details of 
the chemicals used as well as the health and 
environmental data related to hydraulic fracturing. 
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is 
also conducting a study on the impact of hydraulic 
fracturing on drinking water, taking a life-cycle 
assessment starting with the immediate impact of 
fracking fluids and ending with years after the 
                                                      
9 “Bloomberg wants ban in New York”, Upstream, 29 January 
2010. 
chemicals have been pulled out of a formation and 
disposed of. This study is estimated to cost roughly $6 
million and is expected to be ready by 2012, after 
which it could strengthen the case for new regulation 
in this sector. 
The fear of new regulation putting the brakes on 
hydraulic fracturing, and with it the development of 
shale gas, has been so acutely felt within the industry 
that ExxonMobil has even inserted an exit clause in its 
$30 billion acquisition of XTO Energy – a US gas 
independent with solid fracking experience – 
stipulating that Exxon can walk away from the deal 
should new regulations on fracking damage the 
commercial potential of shale gas. 
The life-cycle emissions of natural gas produced from 
shale formations might also at some point become a 
contentious issue. A preliminary two-page paper by 
Robert Howarth of Cornell University claims that 
“when the total emissions of greenhouse gases are 
considered, HVSWHF (high-volume, slick water 
hydraulic fracturing)-obtained natural gas and coal 
from mountain-top removal probably have similar 
releases, and in fact the natural gas may be worse in 
terms of consequences on global warming”.
10 
However, Dr Howarth openly states that his estimates 
are “highly uncertain” and that his numbers “should be 
treated with caution”. While these concerns regarding 
life-cycle emissions have so far not entered the 
political debate, it cannot be ruled out that they might 
gain greater influence in the future.  
Other pertinent concerns include the rapidity of well 
depletion and the water-intensive nature of the 
industry. According to Matthew Simmons, CEO of the 
energy-focused investment bank Simmons & 
Company International, roughly 265 billion litres of 
potable water are needed for the Barnett play, which 
has also experienced high flow rates at the beginning 
of production followed by a rapid decline. A study 
conducted by the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
for example, estimated that on average “horizontal 
Barnett wells have declined by 39% from the first to 
the second year of production and by 50% from the 
first to the third year…[while] vertical wells have 
declined almost as rapidly”.
11 
In spite of these concerns, the development of shale 
gas has powered ahead. A recent report by Houston-
based analyst Tudor, Pickering, Holt (TPH) asserts that 
shale gas is wiping out US LNG demand, predicting 
shipments to the US in 2010 will fall to 51 million 
                                                      
10 Robert W. Howarth, “Preliminary Assessment of the 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Natural Gas obtained by 
Hydraulic Fracturing” (draft paper), Cornell University, 17 
March 2010. 
11 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009. 4 | Roderick Kefferpütz 
cubic meters (mmcm) of gas per day while US 
regasification capacity is close to 425 mmcm per day 
dispersed among nine different terminals on the Gulf 
of Mexico and Atlantic coasts. This is also congruent 
with the Short-Term Energy Outlook forecasts by the 
US Department of Energy. According to the TPH 
report, this would “render US LNG imports nearly 
unnecessary over the next five to 10 years”.
12 It is 
important to note, however, that this assessment does 
not include possible effects of future climate 
legislation on the American power market, which 
would strengthen gas use in electricity production, 
thereby raising demand and boosting prices. Be that as 
it may, the LNG wipe-out in the US has major 
implications for the European Union as those tankers 
will re-direct to the European market, which is 
expanding its LNG re-gasification base, thereby 
putting pressure on prices and particularly traditional 
players such as Russia’s Gazprom.
13 Shale gas will 
therefore have an influential indirect effect on the 
European gas market; whether the EU, however, can 
emulate the US in its shale gale is far from certain. 
Shale gas in the European Union 
Europe is witnessing growing enthusiasm for shale gas 
inspired by its success in the United States. In the 
context of increasing sensitivity about import 
dependency in the wake of two gas crises, many 
consider the EU’s potential shale gas reserves as a 
silver bullet for Europe’s energy security problems. 
Tapping these reserves, they believe, would also not 
only boost the EU’s onshore industry and create more 
jobs but also provide cheaper gas, thereby benefiting 
the overall economy and boosting global 
competitiveness. It would also provide a steady supply 
of a fuel that is more climate-friendly than other fossil 
fuels; natural gas is 30% less carbon-intensive than oil, 
50% less than coal and has negligible emissions of 
sulphur dioxide (SO2), mercury and nitrogen oxides 
(NOx) when compared to other conventional fuels. 
This makes natural gas a crucial fuel of the future in 
terms of climate change, particularly in combination 
with the expansion of renewables; the flexibility of 
natural gas power plants allows quick and efficient 
changes in their level of output in order to 
accommodate any variability in electricity demand and 
supply in the grid that might arise due to the 
intermittency of renewable energy. 
                                                      
12 “Shale gas destroys US LNG demand”, Upstream, 20 April 
2010. 
13 See, for example, Roderick Kefferpütz, “Gazprom’s 
Changing Fortunes”, CEPS Commentary, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Brussels, 30 November 2009 
(http://www.ceps.eu/book/gazprom’s-changing-fortunes). 
On the surface, the European Union also appears 
structurally well-prepared to emulate the shale gas 
success story. Not only is it home to a large and 
increasingly integrated gas market with relatively high 
prices and expectations of a steadily rising demand, the 
EU also has an established pipeline infrastructure. 
Most important, however, is the presence of large shale 
gas deposits in the EU. According to the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), Western Europe alone may 
hold around 15 trillion cubic meters in shale gas,
14 
enough to supply Germany for roughly 175 years.
15 
Poland is considered to be a particularly attractive 
location. A study by Advanced Resources International 
found that Poland alone could have recoverable 
reserves of 3 trillion cubic meters – more than 200 
years of its own consumption. The Polish government 
is also currently verifying and documenting shale gas 
resources on its territory, hoping to have the first 
results of that evaluation by the end of 2010.
16  
Another dynamic strengthening the case for a 
European shale revolution is that, contrary to the 
United States, shale gas development in the EU is 
spearheaded by some of the major oil and gas 
companies. More than 40 companies are already 
engaged in exploring Europe’s shale potential, with 
investigations underway in around 10 countries. 
Poland’s plays are particularly sought after, with over 
40 exploration licences awarded to major players such 
as Chevron, ConocoPhilips and ExxonMobil, the latter 
of which also holds significant acreage in the Lower 
Saxony Basin of Germany. 
Having realised their lost opportunities on the 
American shale market, these large companies are 
naturally eager to catch up and emulate its success 
abroad. This has led to a plethora of deals between 
independent US oil and gas companies and their larger 
counterparts in order for the latter to acquire the 
experience and technical know-how of the former. For 
example, BG Group has launched a joint venture with 
Texas-based Exco, Mitsui & Co. has acquired a stake 
in the Marcellus Shale through a deal with Anadarko 
Petroleum, BP is negotiating a deal with Lewis Energy 
                                                      
14 Many of these reserves are located in Europe’s three major 
regional shale plays. One of the oldest and most sought after 
being the Lower Paleozoic play, stretching from Eastern 
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Basin in northwest England across the Anglo-Dutch Basin as 
well as Northwest German Basin and the third regional play 
similarly extending from southern England to the Netherlands, 
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local plays such as the Vienna and France basins. 
15 Correspondence with the International Energy Agency, 
March 2010. 
16 Correspondence with Polish government officials, December 
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for a joint venture agreement in the Eagle Ford shale in 
south Texas, ExxonMobil has struck a $41 billion all-
stock takeover of XTO Energy, and both Statoil and 
Total have increased their acreage position in the US 
shale market through deals with Chesapeake Energy, 
the second biggest natural gas producer in the US. 
There are also several joint ventures taking place in 
Europe to develop shale. ConocoPhilips, for example, 
is joining forces with Lane Energy Poland, a 
subsidiary of UK-based 3Legs Resources, while GDF-
Suez has forged an alliance with the small explorer 
Schuepbach Energy. These deals are beneficial to the 
extent that they pool the majors holding large financial 
balance sheets with smaller companies holding 
significant experience and know-how. 
These factors have led many to believe that the EU 
will also witness a game-changing rush towards shale 
gas in the coming years.
17 In reality, however, the 
demographic, political, regulatory, environmental and 
social differences between the US and the EU are 
putting the brakes on the development of shale gas in 
Europe. 
First of all, concrete geological data on and experience 
with shale gas is still in its infancy in Europe. Efforts 
to tackle this knowledge gap include GASH (Gas 
Shales in Europe), the first European shale gas 
research initiative launched in 2009 and sponsored by 
a number of mostly European oil and gas companies. 
Second, gaining the support of local residents for shale 
gas would be much more difficult in the European 
Union than in the US. Not only is Europe much more 
densely populated than the United States, it is also 
impossible for many Europeans to reap some of the 
direct benefits enjoyed by their American counterparts. 
Local residents in the US can make impressive sums 
from shale gas by selling the mineral rights they own. 
In New York State, for example, some residents are 
offered as much as $5,500 an acre, with 20% royalties 
on whatever gas is extracted. Conversely, in many EU 
countries, those rights are owned by the state, which 
leaves local residents with all of the trouble and few of 
the benefits. In addition, one could argue that 
environmental awareness in the EU is higher than in 
the US and that this could lead to particularly stiff 
opposition by locals due to the possible contamination 
of water supplies. In Sweden, for example, local 
residents filed a complaint with the administrative 
court in Dalarna (subsequently rejected) demanding 
Shell to stop drilling for shale.  
Third, the European Union faces severe equipment 
shortages in comparison to the United States. The US 
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is home to many rig facilities companies and an 
experienced drilling workforce and has up to 2,000 
onshore gas-drilling rigs operating at any one time. 
Europe, conversely, has little more than 50 with, for 
example, only seven of those located in Poland 
according to Bernstein Research.
18 Companies such as 
PGNiG and BNK Petroleum have already cited these 
particular constraints, as bringing in foreign expertise 
and companies would delay action and could act as a 
bottleneck for development. 
Fourth, water sourcing and local infrastructure might 
also present difficulties given the fact that the fracking 
process requires large amounts of water that may need 
to be transported in and subsequently removed for 
disposal.  
Fifth, labour costs in the European Union are higher, 
as are regulatory and environmental standards, slowing 
the development of shale gas and making it more 
costly. This, in combination with European geology, 
where shale is generally deeper and hence more 
expensive to drill, will make shale gas economically 
less attractive in the EU. While studies by BENTEK 
Energy and WoodMackenzie estimate the break-even 
gas price for some US shale plays to lie between $3 
and $7/mmbtu, estimates for the EU tend to put that 
price above $10/mmbtu.
19 
Sixth, there is no significant political dynamic inside 
the European Union to promote the development of 
shale gas. So far the only indirect mention of shale gas 
reserves can be found in the Second Strategic Energy 
Review, which states that the European Commission 
will commence discussions in the Berlin Fossil Fuel 
Forum “on which additional measures could be taken 
at Community and national level, and in particular in 
partnership with Norway, to further promote the 
increased cost-effectiveness and environmentally-
compatible access to indigenous EU fossil fuels”. In 
October 2009, the Forum set up an additional working 
party focusing exclusively on indigenous fossil fuel 
production. However, the group’s working documents 
have at best given only limited attention to shale gas 
and present no concrete policy suggestions. It is even 
doubtful that the potential of shale gas has been 
included in the figures used by the Commission to 
draft its key energy scenarios and policy documents. 
Parliamentary questions posed by the European 
Parliament to the Commission with regard to shale gas 
have also, to date, remained unanswered.  
Last but not least, while the major oil and gas groups 
looking for shale in Europe can leverage large finances 
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and expertise, their drawn-out decision-making 
processes and risk-averse mindset could also, as 
mentioned by Florence Gény of the Oxford Energy 
Institute, slow down efficiency and development, two 
key factors needed to increase the commerciality of 
shale. 
These factors make it highly unlikely that the 
European Union will undergo a shale gas revolution 
transforming its gas market any time soon. The decline 
in EU conventional production is unlikely to be 
replaced by shale gas in the near-term, meaning that 
LNG and pipeline imports will remain important for 
the foreseeable future.  
One particular country that is trying to buck that trend 
is Poland. Poland holds some of the most attractive 
shale gas deposits in Europe: high quality, relatively 
shallow and often situated in sparsely populated areas, 
lowering the likelihood of resistance from local 
residents. The political administration is eager to make 
use of these deposits in order to improve the country’s 
energy security
20 and, according to some officials, 
strengthen the EU’s position in negotiations with non-
EU gas producers and suppliers. Poland is therefore 
undertaking large evaluations of its shale gas reserves 
and handing out many exploration licences to major 
companies such as ConocoPhilips, Marathon Oil, 
Chevron and ExxonMobil in addition to offering 
particularly attractive fiscal terms, hoping that this will 
create enough of a commercial incentive to develop its 
shale gas reserves. Given the other aforementioned 
constraints, however, such as the problems of water 
sourcing, equipment shortages and environmental 
regulations, it remains to be seen whether Poland will 
indeed be able to fully reap the benefits of its shale gas 
stocks. 
Conclusion 
The obstacles facing shale gas development in Europe 
will not make it a game-changer but neither are they 
insurmountable. While a large-scale European dash for 
shale gas is unlikely to take place, some countries, 
most notably Poland, are better positioned to develop 
shale resources than others – although they too will 
have to overcome several obstructing factors – and are 
eager to exploit their potential given the relevance of 
shale gas for the energy landscape. In this context, it is 
important that EU institutions pay adequate attention 
to this issue considering the possible energy security 
and environmental implications. 
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A first step would be to establish a regular dialogue 
with the United States in order to exchange 
experiences and increase research and development 
cooperation in this field in the vein of the recently 
launched US-China Shale Gas Resource Initiative. The 
EU-US Energy Council seems particularly well-placed 
to act as such a forum. Such a partnership would not 
only avoid any possible duplication but could also 
strengthen cooperation on some of the more 
contentious issues related to shale gas, such as its 
water intensity as well as the hydraulic fracturing 
process and its possible contamination of water 
supplies.  
The European Union would also be well-advised to 
incorporate shale gas in its energy security assessments 
and policies. In this context, it will be interesting to see 
the extent to which the Commission envisages a role 
for shale gas in its forthcoming EU Energy Action 
Plan 2010-2014, to be released shortly. More 
importantly, however, the Commission cannot afford 
to neglect shale gas supplies in its upcoming Energy 
Infrastructure Package for the 2020/2030 horizon, 
envisioned for late 2010, which amongst others will 
look at measures aiming at diversifying gas supply 
sources. 
Last but not least, it is important to note that the global 
development of shale gas and unconventional gas in 
general will undoubtedly have some knock-on effects 
on the European gas market. In fact, it has already 
done so with displaced US-bound LNG having started 
to flood the market, pushing out more expensive 
Russian gas. To what extent this phenomenon will 
continue, however, is hard to predict due to the 
numerous variables affecting supply and demand 
(economic recession, climate and energy legislation, 
pricing, etc.). What seems to be relatively certain, 
however, is that Europe will not create its own home-
grown gas revolution any time soon. About CEPS
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research	programmes	and	through	collaborative	
research	networks	involving	the	active	participation	of	
other	highly	reputable	institutes	and	specialists.
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies
Energy,	Climate	Change	&	Sustainable	Development
EU	Neighbourhood,	Foreign	&	Security	Policy
Financial	Markets	&	Taxation
Justice	&	Home	Affairs
Politics	&	European	Institutions
Regulatory	Affairs
Trade,	Development	&	Agricultural	Policy
Research	Networks/Joint	Initiatives
Changing	Landscape	of	Security	&	Liberty	(CHALLENGE)
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI)
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP)
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI)
European	Network	of	Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy	Research	
Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
CEPS	also	organises	a	variety	of	activities	and	special	
events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.